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NOTES
Criminal Law: Kansas v. Hendricks -

Warehousing Sex

Offenders
Prologue -

A Hypothetical

Suppose you are a parent. You and your family have lived in your neighborhood
for fifteen years. Your child is ten and attends the fifth grade at a local elementary
school.
Nothing much ever happens in your neighborhood. The most excitement occurs
when a newcomer settles in the community. Nonetheless, you have taught your child
not to talk to strangers, never to tell anyone he is home alone, and never to wander
off.
Recently a new neighbor moved in next door. In an effort to be neighborly, you
and your family welcome him to the neighborhood. It is not long before he is
accepted as part of the community. In fact, he volunteers for community projects.
You attend the same church and even invite him to occasional barbecues.
What you do not know about your new neighbor is that he has been repeatedly
convicted for child molestation. Your child may be his next victim. In an effort to
protect the community's children, the legislature enacted a Sex Offender Registration
Act. This Act requires your neighbor to register with local law enforcement. The file
on the community's newest member includes his name and aliases, a photograph and
fingerprints, a list of offenses for which he has been convicted, where the offenses
were committed, where he resides, and how long he intends to remain. The Act
allows for discretionary notification, upon your request, of the information in the sex
offender registry.

Like most repeat sex offenders, your neighbor has been diagnosed with an
antisocial personality disorder. Someone in the medical community determined that
he is safe to be at large. However, his multiple convictions tell a different story. As
a parent armed with limited information, you are left with a sexual predator living
nearby. Residents in the community cry out "Not in our backyard!" The Oklahoma
legislature responds with an involuntary civil commitment statute targeting sex
offenders.
Introduction
Among the many guarantees provided for in the Constitution are the rights to be
free from double jeopardy' and the reach of ex post facto laws.' "[Wlhere so

1.See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 9, cl.
3.
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significant a restriction of an individual's basic freedoms is at issue, a State cannot
cut comers. Rather, the legislature must hew to the Constitution's liberty-protecting
line."3 This line cannot be crossed even to protect society from some of its most
heinous members -- sex offenders. Horrific stories revealing the continuing vic-

timization of our nation's children by sex offenders have spurred the enactment in
numerous states of civil commitment statutes.4
According to the most conservative studies, recidivism rates are chronic among sex
offenders.' One study reported a forty percent recidivism rate during the first three

years after release from prison.6 Despite high rates of recidivism, many offenders

avoid serving long prison sentences. One study showed that eighty-five percent of

a sample of child molesters plea bargained to a lesser sentence For those offenders
that received prison terms, the average sentence was only nine years.' However, of
the 142 offenders studied, only eight-and-one-half percent were diagnosed as
pedophiles' A higher percent were diagnosed as having antisocial personality
disorders."
Although sex offenders have alarming recidivism rates, there is no empirical
evidence suggesting which sex offenders present risks of reoffending." This
explains the medical profession's reluctance to diagnose sex offenders as pedophiles
and to classify pedophilia as a mental illness.' However, the lack of empirical

3. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2098 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
4. At least 16 states have adopted sex offender civil commitment statutes. See ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-4601 to -4613 (West Supp. 1997); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE ANN. §§ 6600-6609.3, 6625
(West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11.7-101 to .7-107 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17a-566 to -571,
17a-573 to -576 (1992 & Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709c (West Supp. 1996) (repealed); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a17 (1994 & Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, §§ 1, 2, 2a, 6a,
9 (Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B (West 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2922 to -2930, 29-2934
to -36 (1995 & Supp. 1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-82.4, -83.1, -84.3, -85, -85.1, -86 t -91 (West
1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1-1 to -1-1-25 (Michie 1998); OR. STAT. §§ 426.510 to .680 (1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-301 to -6-306 (1984 & Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-16-1 to -16-5
(1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.01 to .09.230 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); Wis. STAT. §§
980.01 to .13 (Supp. 1997).
5. See Robert Teir & Kevin Coy, Approaches to Sexual Predators: Community Notification and
Civil Confinement, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 405, 408 (1997) (citing Shari P.
Geller, Zero Tolerancefor Child Molesters;Sexual Predators:Why Do We Release ConvictedPedophiles
So They Can Do It Again and Again? Make It a One-Strike Offense, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at B5).
One study reported an average of 23 child victims per sex offender. See id.
6. See Joyce Price, States FindNew Ways to Stop Sex Offenders, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at
Al.
7. See Lenore Simon, The Myth of Sex Offender Specialization:An EmpiricalAnalysis, 23 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 387 (1997). The study was conducted using the archival records
of 142 consecutive convicted child molesters in 1984 and 1985. See id. at 393.
8. See id. at 398.
9. See id. at 397.
10. See id. at 397-98.
11. See id. at 392-93.
12. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
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evidence has neither calmed the public's fury nor delayed the legislative crackdown
on sex offenders. New Jersey took the initiative in 1994 when it passed a sex
offender notification act, commonly known as "Megan's Law."'3 Currently, all fifty
states have adopted sex offender registration and notification acts. 4
Because registration and notification acts only address the community's need for
information, sex offender commitment statutes are being enacted to continue the
assault on sex offenders. Meanwhile, convicted sex offenders have mounted their
own assault against legislative initiatives by alleging that civil commitment statutes
are unconstitutional. However, in Kansas v. Hendricks,5 a 5-4 decision, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the Kansas civil commitment statute for sexually
violent predators,' despite Hendricks' constitutional challenges. 7
This note discusses the validity of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Commitment Statute as a civil proceeding. Part I examines the constitutional limitations
historically placed on civil confinement. Part II recounts the facts and holdings of
Hendricks and examines the Supreme Court's decision in light of the medical
profession's reluctance to conclude that sexual predators are mentally ill. Part III
exposes the reality that while warehousing sex offenders in state institutions might
be publicly desirable, it must be done without dismantling bedrock principles
protected by the Constitution. Finally, because Oklahoma has proposed a civil
commitment statute tailored for sex offenders, this note warns against enacting such
a statute.
L HistoricalBackground
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that no person be
deprived of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law;" however, no
single source dictates the limits of this doctrine. The essence of federalism ensures
that states are free to develop solutions to' problems and not be "forced into a
common uniform, mold."' 9 However, states must still adhere to court constructed
guidelines to ensure that statutory law fits within a constitutionally permissible
framework.
While the burden of proof required for states to commit an individual civilly is
lower than the burden necessary to incarcerate an individual, the guidelines used by
courts are becoming unclear. Prior decisions by the United States Supreme Court
support the use of general civil commitment statutes to confine mentally ill persons
involuntarily due to their behavior. Narrowly tailored civil commitment statutes,

13. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-11 (West 1994).
14. See Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing to New York v. Ross, 646
N.Y.S.2d 249, 250 n.1 (1996)). Oklahoma's acts are set forth at 57 OKLA. STAT. § 584 (Supp. 1996).
15. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
16. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a17 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
17. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
18. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979).
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targeted to reach sexual predators, require the state to prove an existing mental illness
as well as dangerousness. More recently, the Court indirectly eased the burden on
states by permitting the confinement of sex offenders based on an unpredictable
determination of fiture dangerousness.
A. Burden of Proof
The function of a standard of proof is to "instruct the fact finder concerning the
degree of confidenze our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication."' In a case involving individual
liberty the burden of proof reflects the value society places on the particular
liberty.2!' Courts have repeatedly recognized that civil commitment for any purpose
results in a deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.'
At one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or
emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is
generally acceptable ....
Loss of liberty calls for a showing that the
individual suffers from something more serious than is demonstrated by
idiosyncratic behavior.
In Addington v. Texas, 4 the United States Supreme Court defined the burden
placed on a state to commit an individual involuntarily. The Court determined that
the individual's rights and the interests of the state were best balanced by employing
the standard of clear and convincing evidence?' The Court declined to employ the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard for two reasons. First, the lack of certainty and
fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis places an impossible burden on a state to prove
dangerousness or that an individual suffers from a mental illness.' Second, the
medical community employs the standard of a reasonable medical certainty.27
If a trained psychiatrist has difficulty with the categorical "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard, the untrained lay juror - or indeed even a
trained judge - who is required to rely upon expert opinion could be
forced by the criminal law standard of proof to reject commitment for
many patients desperately in need of institutionalized psychiatric care.
Such "freedom" for a mentally ill person would be purchased at a high
price.?

20. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. See Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).

22.
Jackson
23.
24.
25.

See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979);
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
See id. at 431-33.

26. See id. at 429.
27. See id. at 430.

28. Id. (citation omitted).
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The "moral force of the criminal law"' concedes that some who are guilty will
go free. This is the cost to society to protect the innocent. It cannot be said that it
is better for a mentally ill person to go free than for a mentally normal person to be
committed."
B. Baxtrom v. Herold: Authority to Civilly Confine Criminals Subsequent to the
Expiration of Their Criminal Sentence
The case of Baxtrom v. Herold" articulated the Supreme Court's position
regarding the civil commitment of individuals subsequent to their completion of a
criminal sentence. In Baxtrom, Johnnie K. Baxtrom was certified as insane by a
prison physician while serving a prison term for assault.32 Under the custody of the
New York Department of Corrections, Baxtrom was transferred from prison to an
institution used to confine and care for male prisoners declared mentally ill. 3 The
director of the institution petitioned the court requesting that Baxtrom be civilly
committed.' The State submitted medical certificates certifying that Baxtrom was
mentally ill." At a proceeding in chambers, Baxtrom was given a brief opportunity
to ask questions.' When Baxtrom's sentence expired, the Department of Mental
Hygiene took custody of Baxtrom but determined he was not suitable for civil
confinement. Thus, Baxtrom was remanded to the Department of Corrections for
confinement. 7
After several habeas corpus petitions were denied, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held that any person dissatisfied with an order certifying him as
mentally ill has a right to demand full review by a jury." The Court found that
equal protection requires that mentally ill convicts be released at the termination of
their penal terms unless they are civilly committed like other involuntarily confined
mentally ill persons3 The Court concluded that Baxtrom was denied equal
protection of the law because he was denied a judicial determination that he is
dangerous and mentally ill.6 The Court found no conceivable basis for differentiating between procedures for a person who is completing a criminal sentence and
all other civil commitments' Read broadly, Baxtrom authorized the civil commitment of criminals who have completed their required prison sentences. This broad

29.
30.
31.
32.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
See Addington, 441 U.S. at 429.
383 U.S. 107 (1966).
See id. at 108.

33. See id.
34. See id.

35. See id.
36. See id. at 108-09.

37.
38.
39.
40.

See
See
See
See

id. at 109.
id. at 111.
id. at 110.
id.

41. See id. at 111-12.
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interpretation of Baxtrom paved the way for the civil commitment of sex offenders
following completion of their criminal sentences.
C. Allen v. Illinois: Support for Finding That Sex Offender Commitment Statutes
Are Civil in Nature
Although the Supreme Court generally authorized the civil commitment of
criminals who have completed their criminal sentences, modern statutes narrowly
tailored to reach sexually violent predators must be civil in nature to survive
constitutional attacks. In Allen v. Illinois,42 the Supreme Court examined the nature
of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Person Act (the Act) in light of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.43 In Allen, the defendant was
charged with unlawful restraint and deviant sexual assault." The State petitioned to
have him declared a sexually dangerous person and to have him civilly committed.4"
He was ordered to submit to two psychiatric evaluations." The defendant later
alleged that the information elicited from him violated his privilege against selfincrimination.4 7 Despite the defendant's constitutional claim, the Court held that the
privilege against self-incrimination is not applicable in civil commitment proceedings,
and the Court found him to be a sexually dangerous person within the meaning of
the Act."
The Supreme Court concluded that the Illinois Act is civil in nature based upon
three factors' Finst, the Court looked to the Act's statutory construction." The Act
expressly declared that the Act "shall be civil in nature."5 Second, the Court
recognized that "[t]he State has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers
in providing care to its citizens who are unable ...to care for themselves; the state
also has authority under its police powers to protect the community from the
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill."52 A state's exercise of its
protective powers does not ipso facto make the proceeding criminal. Finally, the
Court found that the statute's purpose was not to punish, but to treat sexually
dangerous persons, 3 Treatment of sexually dangerous persons is the cornerstone of
modern statutory schemes that provide for civil confinement of sex offenders.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

478 U.S. 364 (1986).
See id. at 365.
See id.
See id. at 366.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 367.
See id. at 375.
See id. at 368.
Id. (quoting 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/3.01 (West 1992)).
Id. at 373 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 426).
See id. at 370.
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D. Foucha v. Louisiana: Mentally Ill and DangerousnessRequirements
In Foucha v. Louisiana,' the Supreme Court examined a Louisiana statute
allowing the state to commit persons acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity to
mental institutions until they demonstrate they are not dangerous." Terry Foucha
was charged with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm.56 The trial
court found Foucha not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to an
institution. Four years later, Foucha was conditionally released based on a report
that he was "in remission from mental illness."" The report recognized that Foucha
was in "good shape" mentally but still suffered from an untreatable antisocial
personality disorder
The doctor testified he would not "feel comfortable' in
certifying that [Foucha] would not be a danger to himself or to other people.' "6
The Court, in a plurality opinion, struck down the Louisiana statute.6' The Court
held that when the basis for an insane convict's original confinement no longer exists,
a state is required to establish insanity and dangerousness by clear and convincing
evidence in order to confine the convict beyond the original sentence.62 The opinion
rejected the rationale underlying the Louisiana statute which would have allowed the
State to detain indefinitely insanity acquitees who have personality disorders that may
lead to dangerous conduct.' The true danger is that this rationale could be applied
to any criminal subsequent to the completion of his sentence.' "It would also be
only a step away from substituting confinements based on dangerousness for our
present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible
confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law."'
The Court conceded that in narrowly defined circumstances, a finding of
dangerousness, without more, is sufficient justification for civil confinement.' The
Foucha case, however, is distinguishable from those circumstances for two reasons.
First, a finding of dangerousness in the context of pre-trial detention is justified by
the compelling interest in preventing crime.67 Second, the Louisiana statute failed

54. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).

55. See id. at 73.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 74.
58. Id.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at 75.
Id.
See id. at 86.
See id.
See id. at 82.
See id. at 82-83.
Id.

66. See id. at 80. The Court is referring to the decision in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987).
67. See id. at 81 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749).
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to provide detainees an adversarial hearing.' The fundamental problem is that
Louisiana shifts t1 e burden of proof from the State to the detainee.' The State
should carry the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee
'7
presents an "identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community.
II. Kansas v. Hendricks
A. Facts
During testimony, Leroy Hendricks revealed his chilling history of sexual
molestation. In 1955, Hendricks pled guilty to indecent exposure after exposing his
genitals to two younig girls. Two years later, a court convicted Hendricks of lewdness
involving another young girl. In 1960, he molested two young boys while working
for a carnival. Hendricks served two years in prison for that offense and was paroled
only to be rearrested for molesting a young girl. After attempts to treat Hendricks for
his sexual deviance, he was released in 1965 from a state psychiatric hospital and
determined safe to be discharged into the community.
In 1967, however, Hendricks was imprisoned for performing oral sex on an eightyear-old girl and fondling an eleven-year-old boy. Despite Hendricks' refusal to
participate in the :ex offender treatment program, he was paroled in 1972. For
approximately the next four years Hendricks abused his two stepchildren. In 1984,
Hendricks was again convicted of taking indecent liberties with two teenage boys.
After serving ten years of his sentence, Hendricks was slated for release to a halfway
house. In 1994, the State of Kansas petitioned the state court to civilly confine
Hendricks, pursuant to Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act (the Act),7 and to end
Hendricks' rampant victimization of young children.
Hendricks chalknged the constitutionality of Kansas' Act and moved to dismiss
the petition. The court reserved ruling on the Act's constitutionality and required
Hendricks to undergo mental evaluation at the Lamed State Security Hospital. After
Hendricks' request for a jury trial, the jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator. The trial court also concluded
that pedophilia qualifies as a "mental abnormality" as defined in the Act.
Hendricks appealed the trial court's findings, alleging that the Act violated his right
to substantive due process, his right to be free from double jeopardy, and his right
to be free from ex post fact laws. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the Act
violated Hendricks' right to substantive due process; however, the majority did not
address the double jeopardy or ex post facto claims' n The United States Supreme
Court stayed the Kansas Supreme Court's ruling pending its decision." The United

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id. (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751).
See id.
Id. (quoting Sclerno, 481 U.S. at 751).
KANS. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a15 (1994) (amended 1995).
See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kans. 1996).
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 116 S. Ct. 1540 (1996).
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States Supreme Court eventually reversed the Kansas Supreme Court by upholding
the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act.74
B. Kansas Sexually Violent PredatorAct
In 1994, Kansas enacted the Sexually Violent Predator Act, which provided
procedures for civilly confining persons who, due to a mental abnormality or
75
personality disorder, are likely to commit predatory acts of violence. The Act was
enacted for two reasons: (1) to provide a long term treatment program for the
sexually violent predator; and (2) because general involuntary civil commitment
statutes inappropriately address the unamenable characteristics of sexually violent
predators.76
The Act defines a sexually violent predator as "any person convicted of or charged
with a sexually violent offenseP and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts
of sexual violence."78 Likewise, the Act defines a mental abnormality as "a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses."79
The Act sets forth a specific series of procedures which must be followed in order
to obtain a civil commitment. First, the custodial agency notifies the local prosecutor
prior to the anticipated release of the sex offender." The prosecutor determines
8
whether to file a petition seeking the offender's involuntary civil commitment. '
Once the petition is filed, the court conducts a hearing to determine whether probable
cause exists to find that the detainee is a sexually violent predator within the meaning
of the Act.' If probable cause has been established, the detainee is.professionally
evaluated.'
Subsequent to the evaluation, the offender receives a trial in which the State must
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender is in fact a sexually violent
predator.' Finally, if the State meets its burden, the sexually violent predator is
civilly committed until the offender's mental abnormality is treated and it is
determined that it is safe for the offender to be at large. The Act further requires

74. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997).
75. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a15 (1994) (amended 1995).
76. See id. § 59-29a01.
77. Id. § 59-29a02. Sexually violent offenses include rape, indecent liberties with a child, criminal
sodomy, indecent solicitation of a child, sexual exploitation of a child, and aggravated sexual battery.
The Act provides a catch-all clause including any felony offense comparable to a sexually violent
offense. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. § 59-29a03.
81. See id. § 59-29a04.
82. See id. § 59-29a05.

83. See id.
84. See id. § 59-29a07.
85. See id.
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that the commitment conform to the constitutional requirements for treatment and that
the offender be granted avenues for review.'
C. Majority Opinion
The Court examined whether the involuntary civil commitment of a subclass of
dangerous persons conflicts with the Constitution's doctrine of ordered liberty. In a
5-4 decision, the Court upheld the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act." The
majority examined the Act in light of three constitutional dimensions: substantive due
process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto laws."8
1. Substantive Due Process
While freedom from physical restraint is at the core of the Due Process Clause,
that freedom is not absolute.' Society cannot exist without providing safety for its
members.' The Court recognized that civil commitment statutes have historically
been upheld when the individual poses a danger to public safety.9 The Kansas
Statute "requires proof of more than a mere predisposition to violence; rather it
requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition
that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated."'
The Court likened the Kansas Act to previously upheld civil commitment
statutes.' Hendricks asserted that earlier decisions required a finding of mental
illness before civil commitment can be imposed." He argued that a mental
abnormality is not the equivalent of a mental illness." The Court gave little weight
to Hendricks' assertions because the term mental illness lacks "talismanic sig-

86. See id. §§ 59-29a08 to -29all (1994 & Supp. 1997). Confined offenders were granted three

avenues for review. 1irst, the offender receives an annual review to determine whether continued
confinement is necessary. Second, the secretary of Social Rehabilitation Services may determine, at any
time, whether the offender's mental abnormality has so changed that he should be released. Finally, the
confined offender may, at any time, file a release petition. See id.
87. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997).
88. See id.

89. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
90. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
91. See 1788 N.Y. Laws ch. 31 (permitting confinement of the "furiously mad"); ALBERT DEUTSHi,
THE MENTALLY ILL I'l AMERICA (1949) (tracing history of civil confinement in the 18th and 19th
centuries); GERALD CROB, MENTAL INSTTUTIONS IN AMERICA: SOCIAL POLICY TO 1875 (1973)

(discussing colonial and early American civil commitment statutes).
92. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
93. See id. The Stpreme Court has upheld civil commitment statutes when the statute requires proof
of dangerousness as well as mental abnormality. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 334 (1993) (sustaining
a Kentucky statute allowing for commitment of mentally retarded or dangerous individual); Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) (upholding Illinois statute, permitting commitment of mentally ill and

dangerous person); Minnesota ex reL Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 277 (1940) (permitting
commitment of dangerous individual with psychopathic personality under Minnesota statute).
94. See Hendrick', 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
95. See id.
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nificance."96 Both the psychiatric discipline and the Court use a variety of
expressions to describe mental illnesses.' "Legal definitions, however, which must
take into account such issues as individual responsibility... and competency need
not mirror those advanced by the medical profession." 8
Hendricks undoubtedly satisfied the criteria because of his inability to control his
actions. In fact, Hendricks admitted that when he becomes "stressed out" he cannot
"control the urge" to abuse children sexually." Not surprisingly, Hendricks was
diagnosed as having pedophilia, which is characterized by the medical profession as
a mental disorder." The Court concluded that Hendricks' diagnosis as a pedophile,
which clearly falls within the Act's definition of a mental abnormality, suffices for
due process purposes. 1 '
2. Double Jeopardy
Hendricks argued that the Kansas Act establishes a criminal proceeding resulting
in punishment." ° Furthermore, Hendricks reasoned that the punishment was based
upon past conduct for which he had already been convicted, and therefore violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause."° Unpersuaded, the Court held that Hendricks was not
placed in double jeopardy because the proceedings established by the Kansas Act are
civil in nature."° The Court reached the conclusion that civil commitment cannot
ipso facto be a criminal proceeding merely because the individual has already been
convicted." The Court's rationale is threefold.
First, all proceedings are characterized by looking at the statutory construction."°
The Court normally defers to the legislature's intent."° The legislative intent is
rejected only upon presentation of the clearest proof by the challenging party that the
statute is so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate the legislature's intent.' The
Court reasoned that the Kansas legislature clearly intended to create a civil
proceeding."° In reaching this decision, the Court relied upon the fact that the Act
was placed within the state's probate code rather than the criminal code."0
Furthermore, the legislature describes the Act as a "civil commitment procedure.'

96. Id.
97. See id. (citing to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985)).
98. Id. at 2081 (citing to DSM-IV, supra note 12, at xxiii, xxvii).
99. lit at 2081.
100. See id.
101. See id.

102.
103.
104.
105.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 2085.
See id.

106. See id at 2081.

107. See id. at 2082.
108. See id.
109. See id.

110. See id.
111. Id.
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A second factor examined by the Court was the Act's purpose. The Court
identified two objectives of criminal punishment: retribution and deterrence."' The
majority reasoned that neither of those objectives motivate the enactment of the
Kansas Act."' Because the prior criminal conduct of Hendricks was used merely
for evidentiary purposes to demonstrate that he had a mental abnormality and was
dangerous, the Act is not retributive."" Furthermore, conviction of a criminal
offense is not a prerequisite for commitment under the Kansas Act."' Under the
Act, an individual absolved of criminal responsibility may nonetheless be subject to
commitment."' The. legislature likewise did not intend the Act to serve as a deterrent."' Because sexual predators committed under the Act are by definition
mentally abnormal, they are unable to exercise control over their behavior."'
Therefore, the threat of confinement will not alter the behavior of a sexual
predator." 9 "Thus the fact that the Act may be 'tied to criminal activity' is
'insufficient to render the statute punitive'."''
"If detention for the purpose of
protecting the community from harm necessarily constituted punishment, then all
21
involuntary civil commitments would have to be considered punishment."'
Finally, the Court refused to conclude that the Act is punitive in purpose and effect
merely because the procedural safeguards enumerated in the Act are the same as
those found in criminal proceedings." Rather, the carefully established procedure
evidences great care by the State of Kansas to tailor the statute narrowly to a
dangerous subclass of sex offenders." Certainly, incapacitation is a legitimate end
of both criminal and civil law. The Court used an analogy to drive home its decision:
"A state could hardly be seen as furthering a 'punitive' purpose by involuntarily
confining a person afflicted with an untreatable, highly contagious disease."'"
Therefore, Hendricks' confinement does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause."
The Court's decision merely reaffirms the principle established some thirty years ago
in Baxtrom' There is no basis for distinguishing the commitment of a convicted
offender, subsequent to his penal term, from all other civil commitments.' 7

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (citing United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2149 (1996)).
Id. at 2083.
See id.
See id.

124. I.at 2084. (citing Accord Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Bd. of
Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (permitting involuntary quarantine of persons suffering from communicable
diseases)).

125. See id. at 2086.
126. See Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1966).
127. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997) (reaffirming Baxtrom).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol51/iss3/5

1998]

NOTES

3. Ex Post Facto Claim
Because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to penal statutes, the Court rejected
Hendricks' ex post facto claim." The Act cannot be considered a penal statue for
two reasons. First, it does not impose punishment because it establishes a civil
proceeding." Second, the Act does not apply retroactively." 3 Civil confinement
is based upon a finding that the offender currently suffers a mental abnormality and
is currently dangerous.' Further, the Act did not criminalize conduct before its
enactment nor deprive Hendricks of available defenses.'32 Therefore, the Court found
that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act is not an ex post facto law."3
D. Dissenting Opinion
Relying on different reasoning, Justice Breyer, writing for the dissenting justices,
agreed with the majority's conclusion that the Act's definition of mental abnormality
satisfies substantive due process requirements."3 Hendricks' diagnosis as a pedophile
brings him under the Act's definition of a person suffering from a mental abnormality.'35 Recognizing that the psychiatric profession debates whether pedophilia is
a mental illness, Justice Breyer concluded that pedophilia is a serious mental
disorder." Justice Breyer believes that the psychiatric debate defines boundaries of
reasonableness rather than providing a'definitive answer. Thus, States must only
remain within the boundaries of reasonableness when drafting the law."
Justice Breyer further characterized Hendricks' abnormality as a "specific, serious,
and highly unusual inability to control his actions" rather than mere antisocial
behavior.' This type of abnormality has traditionally been found similar to insanity
for purposes of commitment.'39 Furthermore, the notion of an "irresistible impulse"
is at the heart of the insanity defense."4 Hendricks admitted that his irresistible
impulse to molest children makes him dangerous. 4' Although Hendricks falls outside

128. See id.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

134. See id. at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 2088-89.
See id. at 2089 (citing Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940)

(upholding, over a due process challenge, the civil commitment of dangerous person where the danger

followed from an "utter lack of power to control sexual impulses" (quoting State ex rel. Pearson v.
Probate Court, 287 N.W. 97, 302 (1939))).
140. See id.; see also AMERICAN LAW INST. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (stating that insanity
defense, in part, rests on inability "to conform... conduct to the requirements of the law").
141. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2089.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:573

the scope of a general civil commitment statute, Kansas has the authority to draft a
commitment statute, narrowly tailored, to reach sexually violent predators like
Hendricks. 42
However, the dissent found that the Kansas Act's application to Hendricks was
prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause. 43 Justice Breyer reached the conclusion that
the Kansas Act is punitive by comparing the Act to criminal punishments. First,
Justice Breyer identified incapacitation as a primary objective of the Kansas Sexually
Violent Predator Act.'" The Act provides for secure confinement in the psychiatric
wing of a prison hospital where Hendricks will be treated like an ordinary
prisoner. 45 Second, like criminal punishment, the Act confines only individuals who
have committed criminal offenses." s Moreover, the Act imposes confinement
"through the use of persons (county prosecutors), procedural guarantees (trial by jury,
assistance of counsel, psychiatric evaluations), and standards (beyond a reasonable
doubt) traditionally associated with the criminal law." 47 However, these characteristics alone are not enough to make the Kansas Act punitive.4 Likewise, Kansas'
designation of the Act as civil is not dispositive. 49 The deciding factor is treatment."
"[W]hen a State believes that treatment does exist, and then couples the admission
with a legislatively required delay of such treatment until a person is at the end of his
jail term (so that fluther incapacitation is therefore necessary), such a legislative
scheme begins to look punitive.'' Because Hendricks was convicted, incapacitated,
then confined and offered no treatment, Justice Breyer concluded that the Act
deliberately postpones treatment to justify further confinement.1' If treatment was
a primary objective, then Kansas would require treatment of sex offenders soon after
they begin their penal terms." Finally, Justice Breyer concluded that the Act should
require a consideration of less restrictive alternatives prior to committing, as many
other states do."M T'his failure is yet another indicator that the Act is punitive.'55
Justice Breyer finished by utilizing seven factors listed in Kennedy v. MendozaMartiniez'" to determine that the Act's primary objective is punishment.

142.
143.
144.
145.

See
See
See
See

id
id at 2088.
id. at 2090.
id. (citing to Testimony of Terry Davis, SRS Director of Quality Assurance, App. 52-54,

78-81).
146. See id. at 2091.
147. Id
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 2091-92.
152. See id at 2093.
153. See id. at 2094.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 2095.
156. 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963). The factors listed by the Court are: (1) whether a sanction involved
an affirmative restraint, (2) how history has regarded it, (3) whether it applies to behavior already a
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I believe the Act before us involved an affirmative restraint historically
regarded as punishment; imposed upon behavior already a crime after a
finding of scienter; which restraint namely confinement, serves a
traditional aim of punishment, does not primarily serve an alternative
purpose (such as treatment) and is excessive in relation to any alternative
purpose assigned."
III. Analysis of Hendricks
A. Nature of the Kansas Sexually Violent PredatorAct
1. A Punitive Statute
"One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them
from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less
punishment."'"8 While the Kansas Act civilly confines sexual predators to prevent
future harm, the civil label does not mean the confinement is any the less punishment.
The majority in Hendricks relied on the Court's prior decision in Allen for support that
sex offender commitment statutes are civil. However, Allen did not create a bright line
rule and is distinguishable from the Kansas statute used to confine Hendricks. The
cornerstone of the Allen decision was that the State provided treatment for those
committed under the Illinois statute. "
In Allen, the Illinois court concluded that "treatment, not punishment, was the
primary objective of the statute.""lW In contrast, the Kansas Supreme Court found that
treatment was incidental at best under the Act.' The primary purpose of the Act is
"segregation of sexually violent offenders."'"0 This distinction is important because
the Court normally defers to the findings of state courts regarding the purpose or
intent of a statute.' 63 Moreover, the record demonstrates that at the time of
Hendricks' commitment, treatment was not available and the State had few people on
staff to carry out a treatment program.' " In fact, those who testified regarding the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program believed that effective treatment
was not available and that the Kansas Act creates an opportunity to impose a lifetime
of confinement on sex offenders." Not surprisingly the response by many has in

crime, (4) the need for a finding of scienter, (5) its relationship to a traditional aim of punishment, (6)
the presence of a nonpunitive alternative purpose, and (7) whether it is excessive in relation to that
purpose. See id.
157. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2098.
158. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
159. See id. at 370.
160. Id. at 367 (quoting People v. Allen, 481 N.E.2d 690, 694-95 (111.1985)).
161. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996).
162. Id.

163. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
164. See Testimony of John House, SRS Attorney, App. 255 (acknowledging that no one is hired
to operate the SVP program or to serve as a psychiatrist).
165. See Testimony of Jim Blaufass, App. 503.
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effect been, "So be it!" Responsible lawmaking does not, however, mean that a
legislature may enact any socially desirable law no matter how unconscionable the
effects on an individual's constitutional rights.
The only consideration given to treatment of sexually violent predators in the
Kansas Act is the recognition that long term treatment is necessary and shall conform
to constitutional requirements for treatment." On its face, this recognition sounds
promising but it is in reality a disingenuous look at how much and what kind of
treatment sexually violent offenders should receive. The fundamental problem lies in
defining the constitutional requirements for treatment of confined sex offenders. This
is not a task the Court was willing to undertake. During oral arguments the Court
asked:
So we could - if we ruled your way [the State] we could leave for
another day the question of what to do under, well say, the Foucha rule,
in a case in which there was a recognized psychiatric category of
abnormality but one that was totally untreatable, one that was permanent.
Nothing could be done about it."
It is unclear whether the Court would still have held for the State of Kansas had the
Court been forced to look more closely at the issue of treatment. Based on the
underlying purpose of the statute the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act is punitive.
Labeling the Act a civil statute does not change the Act's purpose, intent, or effect.
2. Comparison to Alternatives
Supreme Court rulings demonstrate that two elements must be present to utilize
civil commitment proceedings. An offender must be both mentally ill and dangerous
to fall within the reach of a commitment statute. A finding of mental illness alone
does not justify confining an individual against his will." Likewise, a belief that an
individual poses future harm to others is not sufficient to commit civilly without the
presence of a mental illness." Because most sex offenders fall between these two
standards, using civil commitment proceedings to incapacitate sex offenders poses
significant problems.
The objectives for civilly confining sexually violent predators are twofold:
incapacitation and punishment. Nothing is inherently wrong with these objectives.
"The point, however, is not how long Hendricks and others like him should serve a
criminal sentence.... The concern instead is whether it is the criminal system or the
civil system which should make the decision in the first place."' ' Kansas could have
served these objectivs by utilizing punitive alternatives available through the criminal
system. First, because Hendricks had at least three felony convictions prior to the

166.
167.
95-9075,
168.
169.
170.

See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a09 (1994).
Oral Argument of Carla Stovall at 12-13, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (Nos.
95-1649), availoble in 1996 WL 721073, at *13.
See O'Connor v,Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992).
Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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State's petition for commitment, his penal sentence could have been tripled under the
Habitual Criminal Act."' Additionally, the court could have sentenced Hendricks to
the maximum sentence instead of the minimum."
During oral arguments before the Supreme Court, counsel for Hendricks suggested
other punitive means of incapacitation. Hendricks' counsel suggested that Kansas
could have imposed life imprisonment, a sentence with restrictive parole conditions,
or an order requiring Hendricks to stay away from children and any public place
where children may be found as alternatives to civil commitment. All of these
methods of punishment would have imposed significant restraints on Hendricks'
personal liberty. In that respect, the alternatives are not distinguishable from civil
commitment. However, the alternatives are distinguishable for other reasons. First, all
of the alternatives could have been made part of his original criminal sentence rather
than imposed subsequently. Second, enforcing some of the alternatives poses a
problem. The key distinction is timing, i.e., when to impose the punishment, not
whether punishment should be imposed at all.
Most courts and statutes require a state to show that the care and treatment
recommended for an individual subject to civil commitment is the least restrictive
alternative." However, this burden often is shifted to the defendant." The Kansas
Act gives no consideration to less restrictive alternatives.
B. The Problem with Mental Abnormality
The Kansas Act acknowledges that sexually violent predators do not have a mental
illness which "renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment" within the general
civil commitment statute. 75 Sexual predators typically have antisocial personality
disorders which are unamenable to treatment for the mentally ill.'76 In fact,
Hendricks' diagnosis as a pedophile makes him an exception to the general population
of sex offenders.' " The Court's holding in Hendricks draws no distinction between
a mental illness and a mental abnormality, or sex offenders and sex offenders
diagnosed as pedophiles. In fact, the Court uses the terms interchangeably. 7" The
presumption that the terms may be used interchangeably is dangerous because it places
no boundaries on the scope of civil commitment statutes.
The conclusion that a mental abnormality is a diagnosis is questionable. Mental
abnormality is not defined in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnosticand

171. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 137 (Kan. 1996).
172. See id.
173. See LINDSAY G. ARTHUR, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT: A MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND
JUDGES 12 (1988).
174. See id.
175. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
176. See id.
177, See supratext accompanying note 9.
178. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1997) (citing to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68, 81 (1985)).
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Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)." Clearly, many believe that the
clinical and legal conceptualizations of mental illness are different. The DSM is a
diagnostic tool to assist the psychiatric community in identifying and treating mental
illnesses." Additionally, the drafters of the Model Penal Code have declared that
personality disorders leading to repeated criminal acts should not be considered mental
illnesses under the law."' Legal definitions of mental illness encompass issues of
safety, fairness, and moral responsibility. Fairness and moral responsibility are
compromised when a state is given unfettered discretion to impose restraints on
personal liberty. Because of the imprecise definition of "mental abnormality" and the
unpredictability of potential dangerousness, sex offender civil commitment statutes are
likely to be misused. The Court has reached a conclusion that neither experts in the
psychiatric discipline nor legal analysts have been able to reach.
The Court's prevlous decision in Foucha rejected a statute that could indefinitely
detain insanity acquitees who have personality disorders that may lead to dangerous
conduct."8 The Court feared that civil commitment of persons who are dangerous
but not mentally ill could be applied to any criminal." The Court's holding in
Hendrickscompletely abandons the concerns raised by Foucha. During oral arguments
in Hendricks, the Court posed a hypothetical to the State: "Imagine an armed robber
who has committed many armed robberies, and a psychologist who says he has a
sociopathic personality. Now, under those circumstances, do you believe it [civil
commitment] would be constitutional . . . ?'
The State distinguished the
hypothetical by alleging that Hendricks suffers from pedophilia, a recognized mental
disorder, which is much more severe than the disorder posed in the Court's
hypothetical.'" This reasoning presumes that all sex offenders characterized as
mentally abnormal have been diagnosed as pedophiles. However, only a small
percentage are actually diagnosed as pedophiles; thus, such a distinction categorically
excludes most repeat sex offenders from civil commitment under the Kansas Act.
Furthermore, the Court made no attempt to distinguish its contradictory holding in
Fouchafrom the holding in Hendricks. Perhaps the Court reconciles the contradiction
because indefinitely confining a violent sexual predator seems less unconscionable
than indefinitely confining a burglar who illegally discharged a firearm.
C. Other States' Civil Commitment Statutesfor Sexual Predators
At least sixteen states have adopted civil commitment statutes narrowly tailored to
reach violent sexual predators." Ten of those statutes, unlike the Kansas Act,

179. See DSM-IV, supra note 12.
180. See id.
181. See Abraham L. Halpem, The Insanity Verdict, the Psychopath, and Post.Acquittal
Confinement, 24 PAC. 1.. 1125, 1135 n.46 (1993).
182. See id. at 82.
183. See id. at 83.
184. Oral Argumert of Carla Stovall at 29, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (Nos. 959075, 95-1649), available in 1996 WL 721073, at *31.
185. See id.
186. See supra not,, 4.
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impose treatment of the sex offender soon after the offender's apprehension."' Seven
statutes, like Kansas', delay civil commitment and treatment until the sex offender has
completed his penal sentence." Of these seven, six "require consideration of less
restrictive alternatives."'" Only Iowa delays both civil commitment and treatment
and does not require consideration of less restrictive alternatives." However, the
Iowa statute differs from the Kansas statute because it applies prospectively, thus
avoiding ex post facto concerns."' The fundamental differences between the Kansas
Act and other states' statutes demonstrate that Kansas' failure to look to alternatives
and the timing of the civil commitment proceeding led to an inference that the
confinement imposed under the Kansas Act is punitive."
D. Application to Oklahoma
Oklahoma does not currently have in effect a civil commitment statute targeting
violent sexual predators. However, State Rep. Laura Boyd, Democrat of Norman,
introduced a civil commitment statute which is being considered during the Second
Session of the 46th Legislative Session." The House Bill is substantially similar to
the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act." The civil commitment statute grants the
care of confined sexual predators to the Department of Mental Health and Substance
Abuse Services."' s Because the Oklahoma statute mimics the punitive nature of the
Kansas Act, the problems with the proposed Oklahoma statute are threefold.
First, the proposed Oklahoma statute insufficiently addresses the need for treatment
of confined sex offenders. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that an involuntarily civilly confined sex offender has an absolute right to treatment.'9 Much like
the Kansas Act, the proposed Oklahoma statute summarily dismisses the issue of
treatment. The Oklahoma civil commitment statute requires that treatment conform
to constitutional requirements." However, the constitutional requirements have not
been determined. In fact the United States Supreme Court chose not to develop the
requirements in Foucha.
The Oklahoma legislature's findings demonstrate that the prognosis for rehabilitating
sexually violent predators is long-term and requires unique treatment modalities."8
Based on these findings, the proposed statute prohibits the release of confined sexual

187. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2095 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 2093.
192. See id.at 2094.
193. See H.B. 2212, 46th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 1997). The House Bill has been reprinted in its
entirety in the appendix to this note.
194. See id.
195. See Okla. H.B. 2212, § 7.
196. See In re Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1980).
197. See Okla. H.B. 2212, § 9.
198. See id. § 1.
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predators until "such time as the person is no longer a threat to the public."' ' "At
this stage of medical knowledge, although future treatments cannot be predicted,
psychiatrists or other professionals engaged in treating pedophilia may be reluctant to
find measurable success in treatment even after a long period and may be unable to
predict that no serious danger will come from release of the detainee."" Given the
bleak prognosis for effective treatment, the procedural safeguards in the statute offer
little chance of release for a sexual predator once he or she is involuntarily committed
under the statute.
As of June 1997, a total of 666 inmates were serving sentences in Oklahoma
prisons for making lewd or indecent proposals or committing sexual acts against
children."' Approximately 1900 sex offenders were listed in a registry maintained
by the Department of Corrections. These 1900 offenders were registered due to a
comprehensive sexual predator notification law recently passed in the state legislature,
in response to the enactment of "Megan's Law."'
Oklahoma's notification law
designates sex offenlers convicted two or more times as sexual predators.' Despite
the large number of sex offenders both registered and convicted, the Department of
Corrections treatment program houses only 160 inmates . ' Although the Department
of Corrections is not responsible for confining those sex offenders involuntarily
committed under the statute, the statute will require complete segregation from other
patients supervised by the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Services.'
Beginning November 1, 1998 sex offenders will be confined in a
separate building.' Given the current limited space in existing treatment programs,
providing effective treatment will prove challenging.
Because it does not provide for adequate treatment, the Oklahoma statute is punitive
and results in double jeopardy. If the proposed statute is to apply retroactively then
Oklahoma faces the additional problem of developing treatment programs for those
offenders whose sentences are nearing an end. Without such treatment the statute is
both punitive and a. ex post facto law. If the proposed statute is to apply prospectively then the legislature has failed to safeguard against those sex offenders slated for
release. Perhaps the better solution is to provide harsher sentences the first time sex
offenders are convicted.
Secondly, the proposed Oklahoma statute operates upon a finding of mental
abnormality. Mental abnormality is defined as "a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit
sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health

199. Id. § 7.
200. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2087 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing to
Testimony of Jim Blaufass App. 503).
201. See Mick Hintcn, Lawmaker Readies PredatorBill: Norman LegislatorFollows Law Upheld
by Court, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), June 26, 1997, at 07.
202. See Brian Ford, Legislator Wants Sexual Predator Law, TULSA WORLD, June 26, 1997, at A9.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See Okla. H.B. 2212, § 7.
206. See id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol51/iss3/5

1998]

NOTES

and safety of others."' By using the broad standard of mental abnormality, the
proposed Oklahoma statute fails to distinguish between sex offenders who are mentally
ill (pedophiles), sex offenders who are not mentally ill but are suspected to pose a
danger of future harm, and those offenders who are both mentally ill and dangerous.
Only those offenders in the last category can be civilly committed constitutionally
under the holding in Foucha. Relying on a standard as broad as mental abnormality
leaves the scope of civil commitment statutes as broad as the legislature's imagination.
Such an involuntary commitment statute could be constructed to target almost any
group of criminals.
Finally, the proposed Oklahoma civil commitment statute does not provide a
procedure to look at less restrictive alternatives. This is a procedure also missing from
the Kansas Act. In many instances the time the sex offenders spend civilly confined
may be equivalent to or even exceed the time the offender spent incarcerated. The
clear purpose of the proposed Oklahoma civil commitment statute is to compensate
for the lax sentencing of sex offenders.
Conclusion
Civil commitment statutes like the one in Kansas are being enacted to stop the
rampant victimization of our nation's children. While the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, the Court disregarded
precedent and weakened fundamental constitutional principles. The Court's decision
reached conclusions that neither the medical community nor legal analysts have been
able to reach with any degree of certainty. The condition of mental abnormality is
simply too imprecise to justify such a significant encumbrance on constitutional
principles.
Warehousing sexual predators may be publicly desirable and even necessary to
prevent sexual predators from reoffending, but because such tactics are punitive in
purpose and effect, civil commitment statutes result in double jeopardy. The proposed
Oklahoma civil commitment statute goes to great lengths to provide procedural due
process. However, acknowledging select constitutional rights and stripping away other
rights undermines our legal system. The proposed Oklahoma civil commitment statute
is as constitutionally infirm as the Kansas Act. The better answer is to incapacitate sex
offenders for a more significant period the first time they are convicted.
Kayci Bair Hughes

207. Id. § 2.
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APPENDIX
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA:
SECTION 1. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-101 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads as follows:
The Legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent
predators exists who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them
appropriate for involuntary treatment of mentally ill persons defined in Title 43A of
the Oklahoma statutes, which is intended to provide short-term treatment to individuals
with serious mental disorders and then return them to the community. In contrast to
persons appropriate fir civil commitment under Title 43A of the Oklahoma Statutes,
sexually violent predators generally have antisocial personality features which are
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities, and those features render
them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior.
The Legislature further finds that the likelihood of a sexually violent predator
engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high. The existing involuntary
commitment procedure for mentally ill persons pursuant to Title 43A of the Oklahoma
Statutes is inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent predators pose to
society.
The Legislature further finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually violent
predators in a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of this population are very
long term and the treatment modalities for this population are very different than the
traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment of mentally ill
persons pursuant to Title 43A of the Oklahoma Statutes; therefore, a separate civil
commitment procedure for the long term care and treatment of the sexually violent
predator is found to be necessary by the Legislature.
SECTION 2. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-102 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads as fbllows:
As used in this act:
1. 'Sexually violent predator' means any person who has been convicted of two
sexually violent offenses and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence;
2. 'Mental abnormality' means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually
violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety
of others;
3. 'Predatory' means acts directed towards strangers or individual with who relationships have been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization;
4. 'Sexually violent offense' means:
a. rape pursuant to Section 1114 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes
b. rape by instrumentation pursuant to Section 1111.1 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma
Statues,
208. 1997 Okla. Hou;e Bill 2212. This is the introduced version as of February 2, 1998.
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c. lewd, indecent proposals or acts against a child under sixteen (16), pursuant to
Section 1123 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes,
d. incest pursuant to Section 885 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes,
e. forcible sodomy pursuant to Section 888 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes,
f. any conviction for a felony offense in effect at any time prior to the effective date
of this act that is comparable to a sexually violent offense as defined in subparagraphs
a through e of this paragraph or any federal or other state conviction for a felony
offense that under the laws of this state would be a sexually violent offense as defined
in this paragraph,
g. an attempt, conspiracy or criminal solicitation to commit a sexually violent
offense as defined in this paragraph, or
h. any act which, either at the time of sentencing for the offense or subsequently
during civil commitment proceedings pursuant to this act, has been determined beyond
a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated; and
5. 'Agency with jurisdiction' means that agency with the authority to direct the
release of a person serving a sentence or term of confinement and includes the
Department of Corrections and the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Services.
SECTION 3. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-103 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering reads as follows:
A. When it appears that a person may meet the criteria of a sexually violent
predator, the agency with jurisdiction shall give written notice of such to the district
attorney of the county where that person was charged, sixty (60) days prior to the
anticipated release from total confinement of a person who has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense.
B. The agency with jurisdiction shall inform the district attorney of the following:
1. The name of the person, identifying factors, anticipated further residence and
offense history; and
2. Documentation of institutional adjustment and any treatment received.
C. The agency with jurisdiction, its employees, officials and individuals contacting,
appointed or volunteering to perform services hereunder shall be immune from liability
for any good faith conduct under this section.
SECTION 4. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-104 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads as follows:
When it appears that a person presently confined meets the criteria of a sexually
,iolent predator and is about to be released, the district attorney of the county where
the person was convicted or the Attorney General, if requested by the district attorney,
may file a petition within forty-five (45) days of the date the prosecuting attorney
received the written notice by the agency of jurisdiction as provided in Section 3 of
this act, alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator and stating sufficient
facts to support such allegation.
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SECTION 5. NBW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-105 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads es follows:
Upon filing of a petition under Section 4 of this act, a judge shall determine
whether probable cause exists to believe that the person named in the petition is a
sexually violent przdator. If such determination is made, the judge shall direct that
person be evaluated for determination as to whether the person is a sexually violent
predator. The evaluation shall be conducted by a person deemed to be professionally
qualified to conduct such an examination.
SECTION 6. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section' 12-106 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads as follows:
Within forty-five (45) days after the filing of a petition pursuant to Section 4 of this
act, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the person is a sexually
violent predator. At all stages of the proceedings under this act, any person subject
to this act shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, and if the person is indigent,
the court shall appoint counsel to assist the person. Whenever any person is subjected
to an examination under this act, the person may retain experts or professional persons
to perform an examination on behalf of the person. When the person wishes to be
examined by a qualified expert or professional person chosen by that person, such
examiner shall be permitted to have reasonable access to the person for the purpose
of such examination, as well as to all relevant medical and psychological records and
reports. In the case of a person who is indigent, the court, upon the request of the
person, shall assist the person in obtaining an expert or professional person to perform
an examination or participate in the trial on the behalf of the person. The person or
the district attorney or Attorney General shall have the right to demand that the trial
be before a jury. Such demand for the trial to be before a jury shall be filed, in
writing, at least four (4) days prior to trial. The jury shall be composed of six persons
having the qualifications of jurors in courts of record. If no demand is made, the trial
shall be before the court.
SECTION 7. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-107 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads a; follows:
The court or jury shall determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person
is a sexually violent predator. If the determination that the person is a sexually violent
predator is made by a jury, the determination shall be by unanimous verdict of the
jury. The verdict or court decision may be appealed. If the court or-jury determines
that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed to the
custody of the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services for
control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a threat to the
public, such control, care and treatment shall be provided at a facility operated by the
Department of viental Health and Substance Abuse Services. At all times, persons
committed for control, care and treatment by the Department of Mental Health and
Substance Abuse Services pursuant to this act shall be kept in a secure facility, and
such persons shall be segregated at all times from any other patient under the
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supervision of the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health and Substance
Abuse Services. Commencing November 1, 1998, such person committed pursuant
to this act shall be kept in a facility or building separate from other patients under the
supervision of the Commissioner. If the court or jury is not satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent predator, the court shall direct
the release of the person.
SECTION 8. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-108 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads as follows:
Each person committed under this act shall have a current examination of the
mental condition of the person made once every year. The person may retain or, if
the person is indigent and so requests, the court may appoint a qualified professional
person to examine the person, and such expert or professional person shall have access
to all records concerning the person. The yearly report shall be provided to the court
that committed the person under this act. The court shall conduct an annual review
of the status of the committed person. Nothing contained int his act shall prohibit the
person from otherwise petitioning the court for discharge at this hearing. The
Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services
shall provide the committed person with an annual written notice of the right of the
person to petition the court for a release over the objection of the Commissioner. The
notice shall contain a waiver of rights. The Commissioner shall forward the notice and
waiver form to the court with the annual report. The committed person shall have a
right to have an attorney represent the person at the hearing, but the person is not
entitled to be present at the hearing. If the court at the hearing determines that
probable cause exists to believe that the person is no longer a threat to the public and
will not engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged, then the court shall set a
hearing on the issue. At the hearing, the committed person shall be entitled to be
present and entitled to the benefit of all constitutional protections that were afforded
the person at the initial commitment proceeding. The district attorney or the Attorney
General, if requested by the district attorney, shall represent the state and shall have
a right to a jury trial and to have the committed person evaluated by experts chosen
by the state. The committed person shall also have the right to have experts evaluate
the person on behalf of the person, and the court shall appoint an expert if the person
is indigent and requests an appointment. The burden of proof at the hearing shall be
upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mental abnormality or
personality disorder of the committed person remains such that the person is not safe
to be at large and, if released, is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.
SECTION 9. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-109 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads as follows:
The involuntary detention or commitment of persons under this act shall conform
to constitutional requirements for care and treatment.
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SECTION 10. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-110 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads as follows:
If the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Services determines that the mental abnormality or personality disorder of a person
has so changed that the person is not likely to commit predatory acts of sexual
violence if released, the Commissioner shall authorize the person to petition the court
for release. The petition shall be served upon the court and the district attorney. The
court, upon receipt of the petition for release, shall order a hearing within thirty (30)
days. The district attorney or the Attorney General, if requested by the district
attorney, shall represent the state and shall have the right to have the petitioner
examined by an expert or professional person chosen by the district attorney or
Attorney General. TIhe hearing shall be before a jury if demanded by the petitioner
or the district attorney or Attorney General. The burden of proof shall be upon the
district attorney or Attorney General to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
mental abnormality or personality disorder of the petitioner remains such that the
petitioner is not saf- to be at large and, if discharged, is likely to commit predatory
acts of sexual violence.
SECTION 11. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-111 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads as follows:
Nothing in this act shall prohibit a person from filing a petition for discharge
pursuant to this act. However, if a person has previously filed a petition for discharge
with he Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Services approval and the court determined, either upon review of the petition or
following a hearing, that the petition was frivolous or that the condition of the
petitioner had not so changed that the person was safe to be at large, then the court
shall deny the subsequent petition unless the petition contains facts upon which a
court could find the condition of the petitioner so changed that a hearing was
warranted. Upon receipt of a first or subsequent petition form committed persons
without the approval of the Commissioner, the court shall endeavor whenever possible
to review the petition and determine if the petition is based upon frivolous grounds
and, if so, shall deny the petition without a hearing.
SECTION 12. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-112 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads as follows:
The Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Services shall be responsible for all costs relating to the evaluation and treatment of
persons committed to the custody of the Commissioner under any provision of this act.
Reimbursement may be obtained by the Commissioner for the cost of care and
treatment of persons committed to the custody of the Commissioner.
SECTION 13. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-113 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads as follows:
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In addition to any other information required to be released under this act and prior
to the release of a person committed under this act, the Commissioner of the
Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse services shall give written notice
of such release to any victim of the activities or crime of the person who is alive and
whose address is known to the commissioner or , if the victim is deceased, to the
family of the victim, if the address of the family is known to the Commissioner.
Failure to notify shall not be a reason for postponement of release. Nothing in this
section shall create a cause of action against the state or an employee of the state
acting within the scope of employment as a result of the failure to notify pursuant to
this action.
SECTION 14. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma
Statutes as Section 12-114 of Title 43A, unless there is created a duplication in
numbering, reads as follows:
This act shall become effective November 1, 1998.
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